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Abstract 
 
The Legal Life of Objects:  
Speaking Evidence and Mute Subjects in  
Mark Twain’s Pudd’nhead Wilson  
 
Valerie Anne Henry, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2014 
 
Supervisor: Matt Cohen 
 
In this paper, I argue that legal authorities assign speaking power to objects and 
evidence in the courtroom in order to deny speaking power to racialized subjects and 
police racial identities.  Mark Twain’s Pudd’nhead Wilson (1894) demonstrates how the 
law transverses the human/object boundary in order to regulate legal definitions of 
identity.  I examine the legal animation of the textual document, as exemplified by the 
last will and testament; the knife, a material object that as a murder weapon is responsible 
for condemning the accused; and the fingerprint, a unique form of bodily evidence that 
merges the textual and the material, in order to understand how these objects blur the line 
between the living and the deceased, between human and nonhuman agency, and between 
body and text.  My methodology brings object studies into conversation with a literature 
and the law approach in order to show not only how the nineteenth-century American 
literary imagination was concerned with testing and regulating racial boundaries, but also 
how fictions employed by the law produce subjects and objects.  My investigation 
 vi 
reminds us that when evidence appears to “speak for itself,” this speech act has been 
carefully orchestrated by human legal authorities who determine what the evidence can 
be understood to mean and for whom it speaks. 
 vii 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Nineteenth-century American literature is permeated with stories of mixed-raced 
persons pushing the boundaries of their racial identity and coming up against the social 
institutions designed to regulate those boundaries and identities.  At the same time, 
nineteenth-century American law developed new legal forms to deal with the unsettling 
transformations taking place around definitions of property.  New corporate forms of 
organization, new technologies of intellectual property, new contractual standards based 
on consent, new definitions of monetary value as speculative, and not least, the transition 
of a sixth of the population from chattel to freemen and freewomen all contributed to the 
American imagination’s need to work through its shifting conceptions of racial, legal, and 
material existence.  When literature and the law scholarship takes up the issue of crossing 
boundaries, it usually generates its critique from the jurisdictional conflicts that expose 
the instability of national or geopolitical boundaries.  Nineteenth-century American 
literature, however, was deeply concerned with another type of boundary—the racial 
identities that determined one’s relationship both to the law and to property rights.  As 
literary critics such as Edlie Wong, Jeffrey Hole, and Carrie Hyde have demonstrated, 
nineteenth-century jurisdictional issues have never been separate from racial boundaries.1 
The most fraught jurisdictional conflict of the nineteenth century, of course, 
erupted into a Civil War that contested the legal meaning not only of the North-South 
                                                
1 These scholars have argued that when literature engages with legal issues, the ideological concepts at 
stake expand the horizon of conflict beyond territorial constraints and open up an imaginative space in 
which issues of criminality and justice become detached from particular jurisprudential locales and can be 
seen as the product not of statutes but of cultural forces.  Not only do these scholars generate valuable 
insights based on the slippages in ideology exposed by jurisdictions, it is notable that their works all engage 
with issues of race and slavery. 
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boundary or the slave-free boundary, but the human-object boundary so violently violated 
and dramatically distorted by the institution of slavery and its legal apparatus.  
Etymologically, “jurisdiction” leads us to the speaking capacity of the law, literally “the 
law speaks.”  In this essay, I will take up the question of how and why the law speaks in 
order to explain, at least in part, why nineteenth-century literature and law fixated on the 
policing of racial identities.  As Caleb Smith has argued, the enactment of justice often 
requires a rhetorical gesture to the transcendence of law beyond its human arbiters.  
Judges and legal authorities perform their own disappearance in order to create the 
illusion that the law speaks for itself (18).  Attention to the way in which the law 
legitimizes certain types of speech allows us to bring racial politics to bear on the 
evidence laws that regulate the production of truth and the subject-object boundary within 
the courtroom.  Using object theory to explain the materiality missing in most critical 
legal studies, I take up the disembodied speaking power of the law and turn it back to the 
material realm, focusing on the objects that, as evidence in a court of law, are believed to 
speak truth in a way human beings cannot.  What is happening when the evidence 
“speaks for itself”?  How does the law empower objects with the capacity to speak, and 
when it does, what type of truth is being produced and why?  Mark Twain’s novel 
Pudd’nhead Wilson (1894) provides the ideal text to answer these questions because it 
explores the legal conditions under which both the racial boundary and the human-object 
boundary can be crossed. 
 Famous for its pithy critique of race as “a fiction of law and custom,” Pudd’nhead 
Wilson has attracted considerable critical attention invested in the novel’s relationship to 
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the racial and legal politics of its era, yet critics have devoted little attention to what 
counts as evidence in Twain’s fiction and how legal definitions of evidence regulate the 
blurred human-object boundary implicit in slavery and its legacy.  Early critics such as 
Earl Briden and Evan Carton, when considering race and law, focus on artistic form and 
authorship rather than Twain’s engagement with historical forces and legal discourse.  As 
cultural studies and new historicism resituated Twain’s novel within the anxieties of its 
historical moment, Eric Sundquist and Brook Thomas each explored the novel’s 
relationship to the legal discourse of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), the landmark Supreme 
Court ruling that legalized segregation as “separate but equal.”  Sundquist characterizes 
the novel as “obsessively devoted to problems of legal rights, evidence, codes of 
authority, and the interplay of ‘natural’ and artificial laws,” but he devotes his work 
primarily to Twain’s critique of race as a performance (53).  Thomas concludes that 
although Twain disproves the logic of the Plessy decision, the novel ends up being a 
social tragedy because he “refuses to imagine a way out for his characters of mixed 
blood” (199).  In terms of legal evidence, Susan Gillman, Simon Cole, Ellen Samuels, 
and Sarah Chinn have all examined the role of fingerprinting as an emerging legal 
method of producing truth and regulating racial boundaries, but although Chinn notes 
how this scientific discourse turns the body into a readable text, Cole provides the history 
of how this scientific method became acceptable in court, and Gillman notes Twain’s 
fixation on “things that in themselves embody questions about the boundary of human 
identity,” no one has suggested that this obsession with human boundaries in the context 
of race and law makes the text a productive site of critical attention for object theory (3).  
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By bringing object studies into conversation with a literature and the law approach, we 
can deepen not only our understanding of Twain’s commentary on the relationship of 
fiction and law, but also the law’s use of objects to police racial boundaries.   
Pudd’nhead Wilson demonstrates the law’s reliance on the speaking power of 
objects to produce a kind of truth that can be seen as originating from objectively 
nonhuman sources despite the ways in which legal authorities animate these objects to 
serve a racialized purpose.  Bruno Latour argues that Western modernity grants the 
highest epistemological authority to an empirical, scientific method that relies on the 
notion that observable, inanimate objects offer an unprejudiced source of information and 
reliability humans cannot.  These scientific facts, however, are created by human experts 
interpreting what they observe.  As Latour asks, “Who is speaking when [the facts] 
speak?  The facts themselves . . . but also their authorized spokespersons” (28-29).  The 
scientific method’s animation of the nonhuman as a speaking subject breaks down the 
division between human subjects and nonhuman objects.  In the same way, when the 
legal system turns inanimate objects into evidence, it endows these objects with the 
capacity to communicate in ways human beings cannot, therefore denying certain 
subjects the right to speak on their own behalf.   
I will focus on three objects in Pudd’nhead Wilson, each a distinct type of 
evidence: the textual document, as exemplified by the last will and testament; the knife, a 
material object that as a murder weapon is responsible for condemning the accused; and 
the fingerprint, a unique form of bodily evidence that merges the textual and the material.  
Attention to these objects, which blur the line between the living and the deceased, 
 5 
between human and nonhuman agency, and between body and text, in turn allows 
Pudd’nhead Wilson to contribute to the methodological debate within the literature and 
the law movement.  The literature and the law movement can be divided into three main 
approaches: humanism; hermeneutics; and narrative.2  The hermeneutic approach, also 
called law-as-literature, builds from the premise that law consists of language and texts 
(statutes, judicial opinions, contracts, etc.) and therefore requires the tools of 
deconstructive theory to reveal the instability of its interpretive meanings.  Spearheaded 
by Stanley Fish, the hermeneutic method emphasizes the necessarily contextual and 
variable nature of all interpretive acts.3  As the heyday of deconstruction declined, a 
narrative approach to law emerged with the premise that all law requires the construction 
of narrative explanations, and therefore legal outcomes are dependent on subjective 
constructs.  The limitation of both the hermeneutic and the narrative approach is that 
these methods remain oriented toward law as a text, when of course the law involves so 
much more.  The status of the law as a set of either textual or material relations is itself 
charged with the question of where legal agency rests.  While I draw on the narrative 
approach’s recognition of the problem of subjective constructs, I argue that a turn to 
objects allows us to go beyond the instability of language and the limiting definition of 
law as a text.  Twain’s novel demonstrates that when a legal authority presents evidence 
                                                
2 Jane Baron discusses these three approaches in more detail in “Law, Literature, and the Problems of 
Interdisciplinarity” (The Yale Law Journal 1999).  For another excellent discussion of the state of the 
discipline see Julie Stone Peters’s “Law, Literature, and the Vanishing Real: On the Future of an 
Interdisciplinary Illusion” (PMLA 2005). 
3 A sustained discussion of the hermeneutic approach can be found in Interpreting Law and Literature, eds. 
Sanford Levinson and Steven Mailloux (1988).  Levinson and Mailloux propose that law consists of the 
“legal event” of reading and interpreting texts, and foreground hermeneutics because “ascertaining the 
meaning of texts is a central reality of any legal system” (ix). 
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not as a text to be interpreted but as a self-evident empirical object, the law treats the 
object as direct testimony not needing the interpretative process that makes subjectivity 
visible.  When we see the law as the manipulation of sources of speaking power instead 
of an interpretation of texts, we understand how the fictions of law produce subjects and 
objects. 
Considering the affective ways in which objects have been animated with extra-
material meaning, Bill Brown’s theory that human desire can animate an object with a 
“life story” that grants it humanlike subjectivity correlates with my theory that evidence 
law and criminal procedure animate objects to regulate speaking power and the 
production of truth before the law.4  In a criminal court, the agency or speaking power 
assigned to evidence holds the power to condemn or exonerate, kill or imprison, enslave 
or set free.  By tracing the life stories of the evidence used to condemn Tom Driscoll in 
Pudd’nhead Wilson, I argue that these objects are assigned an agency that allows their 
human possessors to police racial boundaries without seeming to do anything except let 
the truth speak for itself.  Evidence law and criminal procedure add a crucial stage to the 
                                                
4 In The Social Life of Things, Arjun Appadurai proposes a related method for studying objects that 
involves “follow[ing]” commodities to find the meaning “inscribed in their forms, their uses, [and] their 
trajectories,” from production to exchange to consumption, with attention to the “human transactions and 
calculations” that “enliven things” with “social lives” (5, 13).  Because this theory of the object focuses 
solely on the commodity form, only one stage in an object’s life story, it is of limited use for my purposes.  
Elaine Freedgood, in “What Objects Know: Circulation, Omniscience, and the Comedy of Dispossession in 
Victorian It-Narratives,” proposes that stories told by object narrators help modern subjects reconcile the 
contradiction between the ideal of the autonomous self and the alienable self demanded by capitalist labor 
and emerging legal definitions of the human.  She concludes that the omniscience of the object narrator, 
much like the invisible observation available to marginalized subjects like women, children, the colonized, 
the poor, and the enslaved, privileges these transgressors of the subject/object boundary to greater access to 
certain types of knowledge.  Her argument, while demonstrating the complexity of the literary 
imagination’s animation of objects with human voices, does not take into account the ways in which 
speaking objects are used to deny these marginalized subjects a voice. 
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life stories of these objects, a legal life, in which the way evidence is prepared, presented, 
and accepted in court assigns these objects the central role in Twain’s climactic 
courtroom drama. 
The rules of evidence law and criminal procedure regulate what gets into the 
courtroom and how it can be used once there.  For example, in People v. Crispi (1911), 
one of the earliest fingerprint trials in the United States, the prosecutor had to overcome 
strenuous objections that this evidence was irrelevant (Cole 241).  The prosecutor’s 
struggle to convince the court to recognize a new type of evidence demonstrates the 
power of evidence rules to police the knowledge used to establish the defendant’s 
innocence or guilt.  As Twain’s lawyer Wilson demonstrates in the novel’s climactic trial 
scene, proving the significance of the evidence requires a carefully planned performance 
that wins the acceptance of the judge, jury, and general public.  The success of the 
evidence’s ability to speak to the crime depends on the narratives that are constructed to 
explain the object’s relationship to the crime. 
The policing of legal and racial identities in Twain’s novel crucially depends on 
the evidence laws that ostensibly regulate objects, but actually regulate objects in order to 
reclassify subjects as criminal.  As Twain demonstrates, assigning a criminal identity to a 
subject, just like categorizing subjects with a racial identity, involves a transgression of 
the subject/object boundary.  An examination of the legal life of the objects in 
Pudd’nhead Wilson reveals Twain’s commentary on the law’s ability to deny speech to 
criminalized, racialized subjects and turn them into inanimate objects by assigning that 
speech to the objects that serve to condemn them.  When Tom’s condemnation at the 
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culmination of the murder trial transforms him from a wealthy aristocrat into slave 
chattel, the legal system demonstrates its power to transform subjects into objects as well 
as its investment in regulating the racial hierarchy this boundary enforces. 
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STANDARDS OF PROOF AND THE PRODUCTION OF TRUTH 
 The manipulation of evidence Twain’s characters use to establish truth reveals 
how tenuous proof can be and yet still accomplish conviction.  As Chinn notes, the 
novel’s plot revolves around “information shared and withheld—who knows what and 
when” (37).  Gillman likewise places epistemological concerns and problems of 
knowledge, especially those raised by the systems of classification inherent to race and 
slavery, at center of the novel (72).  When the black maid Roxy convinces the young 
aristocrat Tom that he is in fact her son and a slave, Roxy produces no evidence to 
support her claim, and yet Tom believes her completely.  With her canny perception of 
how the laws of identity can be manipulated, Roxy functions as Twain’s figure for 
demonstrating the performative structure underlying the production of truth.  Twain’s 
performed truths include both law and race.  By drawing attention to the performative 
aspects underlying his characters’ epistemologies, Twain not only “portray[s] race as a 
role,” as Sundquist says, but suggests legal classifications are likewise made real through 
performance (50). 
After switching her infant son with the master’s son, Roxy must perform her new 
relationship to the son that has now become her master.  The effect of her performance is 
so persuasive she becomes beholden to her own fiction: “by the fiction created by herself, 
he was become her master” (PW 77).  Her outward performance creates an inward reality.  
Knowing that her deception can only be maintained by “perfecting herself in the forms 
required,” her “diligence and faithfulness in practicing these forms . . . soon concreted 
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itself into habit; it became automatic and unconscious; then a natural result followed: the 
deceptions intended solely for others gradually grew practically into self-deceptions as 
well; the mock reverence became real reverence, the mock obsequiousness real 
obsequiousness, the mock homage real homage” (PW 77).  The production of the babies’ 
new identities is a matter of perfecting a form.  The “counterfeit” difference between 
slave and heir “became an abyss, and a very real one—and on one side of it stood Roxy, 
the dupe of her own deceptions, and on the other stood her child, no longer a usurper to 
her, but her accepted and recognized master” (PW 77).  The process by which identity 
becomes real, in Twain’s formula, begins with practice and performance, which cements 
into habit, and once this “form” is accepted unconsciously, it becomes real.5  Despite 
originating as a fiction and a form, the new identities have all the consequence and 
weight of reality.  In the same way, legal forms and procedures, although they may 
originate as inventions and conventions, hold very real consequences in practice.  As 
Roxy loses her son to this fiction, she realizes that her performance cannot be undone: 
“She saw her darling gradually cease from being her son, she saw that detail perish 
utterly; all that was left was master—master, pure and simple” (PW 81, emphasis 
original).  Through form and performance, the fiction has ceased to be such. 
Considering that Roxy’s authorization of this fiction of identity mimics the power 
of the novel as a form that created new yet real subjectivities, critics have debated 
Twain’s own relationship to artistic production.  Critics such as Forrest Robinson, 
                                                
5 Susan Gillman interprets Roxy’s performative creation of the infants’ new identities as a commentary on 
authorship.  In Gillman’s reading, Roxy authorizes their new identities in a way strikingly similar to the 
compositional process that Twain so often draws attention to in his work (74).  Form, as we shall see, 
unites Twain’s style with his racial and legal critiques. 
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Shelley Fisher Fishkin, and Hsuan Hsu have suggested Twain shifted from journalism to 
fiction in search of a more effective mode of social critique.  Hsu suggests Twain’s 
experience as a journalist led him to believe fiction held certain advantages over 
nonfiction because fiction allowed him to satirize racially discriminatory police practices 
that newspapers were unwilling to address (72).  Twain’s formal techniques—his irony, 
courtroom farces, and journalistic parodies—“bring literary techniques to bear on racial 
discourses” (76).  However, Twain’s critics have struggled to explain his tendency to 
brush over serious racial commentary with comedy that alleviates the felt need to address 
racial issues.  Gillman notes that Twain’s use of the popular conventions of the detective 
genre seems to “offset an implicitly historical and contextualized sensibility with a 
conventionalized, melodramatic mode” (70).  The detective plot, culminating in the 
revelation of the murderer, seems to hide the traumatic disruptions of slavery behind 
narrative coherence.  However, as Carton and Gillman have both suggested, Twain’s 
conclusion implicates the reader and all of society in the crime of selling Tom down the 
river, and in this way Twain reneges on the promise of the detective plot to deliver justice 
and restore order (Carton 91; Gillman 92).  The narrative arc available in the novel form 
allows Twain to capitalize on his readers’ thwarted expectations and leads them to 
deconstruct the novel’s flawed conclusion. 
 Likewise, Roxy attempts to deconstruct the fiction she has created, but she is 
limited by her lack of evidence.  Outraged at becoming her own son’s property, Roxy 
begins to “plan schemes of vengeance” and “revel in the fancied spectacle of his 
exposure to the world as an imposter and a slave,” but she cannot take satisfaction in her 
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fantasies, because “she had made him too strong; she could prove nothing” (PW 81).  She 
understands that proof requires a certain kind of speaking power.  As a slave, her word 
means nothing, and she berates herself for “not providing herself with a witness for use in 
the day when such a thing might be needed” (PW 82).  Without a witness, she cannot 
meet the demands of proof.  Roxy solves this dilemma when she realizes that conviction 
can be produced without evidence. 
 When Roxy convinces Tom of his true identity using nothing but a bluff, Twain 
demonstrates that proof does not, in fact, require physical evidence, only a convincing 
performance.  When Roxy reveals Tom’s origins, he defends himself by calling the 
revelation “moonshine” and “a thundering lie,” and by calling Roxy a “miserable old 
blatherskite,” a “devil,” and a “beast” (PW 112).  Tom’s instinct to invalidate her 
accusation by calling attention to her subservient status arises from the law’s privileging 
of certain voices over others.  Tom is correct that his word against hers is his best defense 
and that all a well-to-do gentleman needs to do to invalidate the claims of a former slave 
is to say so.  Roxy defeats him, however, with an elaborate bluff: “I don’t mind gitt’n’ 
killed, beca’se all dis is down in writin’, en it’s in safe hands, too, en de man dat’s got it 
knows whah to look for de right man when I gits killed” (PW 113).  Roxy dominates him 
with the mere threat of proof: “I’ll tramp as straight to de Judge as I kin walk, en tell him 
who you is, en prove it.” (PW 114, emphasis original).  Not only does Tom believe her, 
he wails, “I more than believe it; I know it” (PW 114, emphasis original).  Roxy’s 
performance creates Tom’s conviction.  Her bluff works because she identifies her 
audience as her standard of proof: “she knew the person she was dealing with, and had 
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made both statements without any doubt as to the effect they would produce” (PW 114).6  
Twain suggests proof and conviction result from the skillful manipulation of the elements 
of an effective performance.  When we see legal truth as the product of a performance, 
we begin to direct out attention not to what the evidence means but to who is making the 
evidence signify. 
                                                
6 Ellen Samuels explains Roxy’s newfound understanding of discursive manipulation as a power she gains 
from the disability (rheumatism) that makes her aware of her body as both marginalized and empowered.  
As Samuels notes, prior to her disability, Roxy despairs that she has no proof; afterward, she understands 
how to produce her own truth.  The disabled body casts Roxy as both victim/object and agent/subject, and 
“enables her to see beyond the fictionality of objectification, to see that identification can be discursively 
manipulated” (77). 
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THE LEGAL AFTERLIFE: THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
 As historians and legal scholars such as Eva Saks have suggested, the increasingly 
strict miscegenation laws imposed after emancipation arose in part from the white 
population’s anxiety that white property might pass into black hands (66-68).  This legal 
imperative suggests that inheritance lies at the heart of the law’s efforts to police racial 
boundaries.  The last will and testament, the legal document with the power to transfer 
property from one generation to the next, carries the cultural responsibility of ensuring 
property ends up in the right hands.  As Jeffory Clymer suggests, black claims to 
inheritance from white family members forced late nineteenth-century judges to redefine 
the meaning of the family to shore up the economic consequences of miscegenation and 
“maintain[] white concentrations of wealth” (23).  Judges, jurists, and legislators 
tightened miscegenation laws in the 1890s because slave law no longer operated to deny 
mixed race heirs their inheritance (Bentley 466).   
In Pudd’nhead Wilson, the status of the will, like Roxy and Tom’s racial 
identities, is continually in flux.  Not only does Judge Driscoll’s will rule the financial 
fate of both Tom and Roxy, the materiality of the will plays a crucial role in 
demonstrating the fragile nature of property inheritance in post-emancipation America.  
U.S. law, as Brook Thomas and other legal scholars have traced, inherited from Great 
Britain a set of principles and operating assumptions preoccupied with property rights 
(Cross 17).  The law’s investment in protecting property remains a pivotal guiding 
principle to this day, particularly in terms of the law’s procedure for dealing with death.  
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The last will and testament legally ensures the continuance of wealth through generations 
despite individual demise.  At the same time, death is an event that allows the law to 
intervene in property relations, providing an opportunity for taxation, readjustments, and 
settlements that all fall under the law’s domain and thus allow the law to regulate racial 
boundaries at this crucial moment of human and material transition.  The last will and 
testament centers legal procedure as the means through which a family perpetuates both 
its wealth and its members’ status before the law. 
 When considered in combination with object theory, the last will and testament 
can be understood as the law’s method of extending human agency beyond death through 
the regulation of property, effecting what I will call a “legal afterlife.”  The law’s 
procedure for dealing with death transfers an extinguished human agency into a legal 
document that comes alive and takes power upon the event of human death.  The 
language of the “testament” embedded in the legal term reveals the law’s investment in 
imagining the possibility of speaking power from beyond the grave.  This legal afterlife is 
especially fraught when the property left behind includes human lives.  That the last will 
and testament can redefine a person’s slave/free or human/property status demonstrates 
the way, as Stephen Best proposes, that slave law and commodity culture merge to create 
a form of living property, a legal animism that blurs the boundary between persons and 
things (2-3).  Through the figure of the slave, Gillman argues, Twain satirizes “the legal 
fiction that a slave is both property (an extension of the master’s will) and non-property 
(in that he can be tried for very willful, antisocial acts, such as murder)” (72).  The slave 
as a commodity form functions like the last will and testament as an imagined extension 
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of the master’s will, yet the slave’s ability to cross the human-object boundary when 
criminal guilt is concerned complicates the location of this agency.  Best has located the 
“afterlife” of slavery “within the text of the law” in the aesthetics of representation that 
legal structures rely on to define the limits of the human (14).  The legal afterlife effected 
by the last will and testament creates the illusion of agency beyond death in order to 
transfer this latent human agency into a legal form that takes on the power to reduce 
humans to property, regulate the distribution of this property, and thus reestablish 
racialized legal identities. 
 When Tom’s father Percy Driscoll dies, he leaves a will but little else behind in a 
turn of fate that emphasizes the will’s speculative nature, always subject to the 
vicissitudes of outside forces, both financial and legal.  Percy Driscoll’s estate is 
bankrupt, a detail that comes back at the end of the novel to claim Tom for a life of 
slavery, but Driscoll attempts to preserve his family’s honor if not its financial security.  
Driscoll makes special provisions to avoid the public scandal of his slaves being sold 
down the river, “for public sentiment did not approve of that way of treating family 
servants” (PW 82).  The estate intended to pass to the (supposedly) white heir Tom, 
however, no longer exists.  Driscoll’s “great speculative landed estate” lost its value 
when the market collapsed and “left his hitherto envied young devil of an heir a pauper” 
(PW 82).  This reversal of fortune, however, does not disinherit the son, for his uncle, 
Judge Driscoll, “told him he should be his heir and have all his fortune when he died” 
(PW 82).  The inheritance Tom receives from his (supposed) father is not property but a 
confirmation of his family relations and the right of blood. 
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The reader knows, however, that by blood the inheritance belongs to Chambers, 
the “real heir” who has been usurped by Roxy’s switch (PW 75).  Twain’s narrator, 
despite claiming to “accommodate itself to the change which Roxana consummated,” 
continues to delimit Tom’s status as imposter, labeling Tom “the false heir” during the 
boys’ adolescence and calling him the “idolised ostensible son” when his dying father 
bestows upon him provisions for his future (PW 75, 79, 82).  Although Briden has argued 
that the narrator accommodates the new names and “acquiesces in precisely the kind of 
fiction which is the subject of his story . . . the communal habit of mind and speech,” in 
fact the narrator has not forgotten their original identities and continues to describe 
Chambers as the true heir “whose name [Tom] was unconsciously using and whose 
family rights [Tom] was enjoying” (Briden 178; PW 104).  Carton argues that the 
narrator’s continued use of judgment-laden epithets like “false heir” draws a connection 
between “the threatened social order and the threatened novelistic one” (88).  The 
narrator’s insistence on keeping the boys’ original identities in the reader’s mind raises 
the question of what kind of inheritance—racial, material, and narratological—Twain 
imagines his characters deserve. 
Percy Driscoll’s preoccupation with managing his estate actually leaves his estate 
vulnerable to usurpation.  Any interaction he might have with his son appears in 
economic terms as “commerce,” and his inattention to the children in favor of managing 
his speculations leaves Roxy in charge of the heir to his estate (PW 64).  His relegation of 
the labor of child rearing to his domestic servant exposes the future of his estate to her 
machinations.  Because clothing functions in the novel as the most significant cultural 
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marker of identity, Roxy, as the one who dresses the children, bestows upon them their 
cultural identities, and she soon becomes aware of the power she holds to decide the fates 
of the children.7  When Wilson asks, “How do you tell them apart, Roxy, when they 
haven’t any clothes on?” Roxy laughs and answers in a way that emphasizes her power, 
“Oh, I kin tell ’em ’part, Misto Wilson, but I bet Marse Percy couldn’t, not to save his 
life” (PW 65, emphasis original).  What needs saving here is not his life, but his afterlife, 
the inheritance of his property.  Although Roxy worries that her master will notice the 
children have been switched, “one of his speculations was in jeopardy, and his mind was 
so occupied that he hardly saw the children when he looked at them” (PW 74).  Percy is 
concerned with his legacy, but not the child upon which this legacy depends.   
Because of the gendered nature of child rearing, Roxy holds the power to change 
the course of property inheritance: “Roxy remained in charge of the children.  She had 
her own way, for Mr. Driscoll soon absorbed himself in his speculations and left her to 
her own devices” (PW 58).  The woman of the house, Roxy has “charge” of the inheriting 
generation and controls the future of the estate in a way Percy Driscoll does not.  Driscoll 
prepares for the future of his son and his estate by recording himself in a text, an act that 
anticipates the central function of the will as a legal document that carries out one’s 
agency beyond death.  Instead of interacting with his infant son, Driscoll writes in his 
                                                
7 A number of critics have noted the importance of clothing as a social marker of identity and status in the 
novel.  Gillman notes that all identities in Dawson’s Landing are based on cultural markers like clothing, 
naming, and titles (75-6).  Carton also notes that “only superficial trappings—name and clothing” separate 
the two children, and he likens Roxy’s switch to an act of authorship that creates a “counter-fiction” in 
opposition to the fiction already present in social conventions like clothing and race (86).  Simon Cole 
likewise notes that the white father can only tell the children apart “by social, not biological markers—their 
clothing” (236). 
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diary so one day his son can read about his “magnanimity” “in after years” and “be 
thereby moved to deeds of gentleness and humanity himself” (PW 68).  As Driscoll 
imagines his son’s future, his heir exists not as the child before him, but as an imagined 
future man.  Unable to see the child itself as his heir, Driscoll loses control of his legal 
afterlife, and his last will and testament fails to extend his agency beyond his death.8 
As the heir to Judge Driscoll, Tom understands his fate in terms of the last will 
and testament that is both a text and an object.  Twain emphasizes the materiality of the 
legal document in the repeated tearing and redrawing of the will.  The will and its 
physical state (whole or torn) becomes a gauge of the human relationship.  As Judge 
Driscoll uses the threat of disinheritance as leverage to combat Tom’s gambling problem, 
the continual reversals of the will emphasize the instability of property and inheritance.  
When Chambers reveals that Judge Driscoll has “tuck ’n’ dissenhurrit him” and Roxy 
fails to understand the meaning of the word—“Dissenwhiched him? . . . What’s dat?  
What do it mean?”—Chambers explains in terms of the will’s materiality, figuring the 
will as an object that can be destroyed: “Means he bu’sted de will” (PW 103).  Twain’s 
characters can only understand the reversals of the will in material terms: “dey’s a new 
one made . . . ole Marse forgive him en fixed up de will ag’in” (PW 104).  Wills can be 
“fixed up” like an object that has been broken.  Again the will figures as a fragile 
physical object when Tom imagines the will can be “smashed” (PW 120).  Indeed, when 
Judge Driscoll learns of his nephew’s cowardice, he destroys the will once more by 
                                                
8 Driscoll’s responsibility for the disinheritance of his biological son can also be read as a commentary on 
the way the slave system often made the master responsible for enslaving his own children (Gillman 64).  
Also see Joel Williamson, New People: Miscegenation and Mulattoes in the US (1980), for the argument 
that white people were essentially enslaving themselves in the form of their children by black partners. 
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physically tearing it to pieces: “repeating that lament again and again in heartbreaking 
tones, [he] got out of a drawer a paper, which he slowly tore to bits, scattering the bits 
absently in his track as he walked up and down the room, still grieving and lamenting” 
(PW 142).  As a physical object that passes through stages of brokenness and restitution, 
the will’s life story reflects the tumultuous relationship between uncle and nephew.  The 
status of the will as “smashed” or restored allows these two family members to enact a 
struggle over property rights and an imagined futurity that presages the physical violence 
of the murder.  Figured as an object, the will can enact the violence of nineteenth-century 
contestations over property in a way it could not as a text. 
As a legal form intended to extend a person’s agency beyond death, the drawing 
of a will requires an imaginative process that resembles the production of reality from 
fiction previously demonstrated by Roxy.  The will influences human behavior, even 
before the death by which it takes effect, because its creator imagines it as his primary 
means of mitigating the consequences of death.  Judge Driscoll redraws the will for a 
second time because he thinks he may die in a duel and wishes to honor the last wishes of 
his deceased brother who “entrusted [Tom] to me . . . on his dying bed” (PW 153).  In 
this way, the specter of death, both one’s own and that of one’s dead relatives, exerts a 
posthumous influence on the imagined future of the inheritance.  Because the imagined 
death and the imagined future property transfer are removed from the present tense of the 
will’s legal life, this legal form remains embedded in a speculative fiction that 
demonstrates how legal agency is imagined into existence. 
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The imagined agency of the will takes on new life when Judge Driscoll dies.  As 
Wilson contemplates whether Tom would have had any motive to kill his uncle, Twain’s 
language twice describes the will as being “revived” as if it were a living thing brought 
back to life (PW 199).  The will has taken on the ability to live despite—and because 
of—its owner’s demise.  While the last will and testament is imagined as securing the 
relationship of the dead man and his heir to his material remains, it in fact unsettles the 
boundary of living and dead, subject and object, human and nonhuman.  The language 
used to animate the will with a legal life of its own allows the law to intervene in the 
renegotiation of this boundary without becoming visible.  Just as the speaking power of 
evidence elides the human authorities performing its meaning, the last will and testament 
appears to speak for the deceased while actually returning regulatory power to the law. 
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THE MURDER WEAPON AS WITNESS 
To understand the power physical objects hold in the courtroom, we must turn to 
the powerful narratives that assign these objects meaning.  In Twain’s novel certain 
objects, such as Luigi’s Oriental knife, are given special agency to drive the course of 
events.  When the knife becomes a murder weapon and a central piece of evidence in the 
trial, it acquires the ability to “witness” to the events of the crime.  Instead of human 
witnesses, Twain’s trial scene revolves around speaking objects that disguise the law’s 
regulation of racial boundaries as empirical forensic science.  The life story of the knife 
serves to exonerate human agents from the process of condemnation. 
The life story of the knife begins with a homicide precedent when the Italian 
twins explain how Luigi’s killing of a man should not be classified as murder.  Angelo 
explains the deadly act in terms of the knife’s history as an object of curiosity: “I keep 
that weapon yet that Luigi killed the man with, and I’ll show it to you some time.  That 
incident makes it interesting, and it had a history before it came into Luigi’s hands which 
adds to its interest” (PW 130).  The knife, Angelo explains, was given to Luigi by an 
Indian prince and had been used in its past life to kill numerous people.  The twins 
imagine the knife itself as having caused the attack and subsequent murder: “the knife 
was to blame” (PW 131).  Their story assumes the attacker intended to steal the knife, 
making it motive, agent, and instrument in the deadly incident.  The life story of the knife 
animates its legal agency so that the knife exonerates Luigi from blame in what would 
later be referred to by the people of Dawson’s Landing as an “assassination.” 
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When the knife is stolen, Wilson and the twins believe the knife will solve the 
crime itself.  Wilson sets a trap to ensnare the thief in which the knife’s high monetary 
value will induce the thief to reveal himself.  Briden explains that the legal language with 
which Twain surrounds the knife even before the murder or trial scene implicates the 
knife in extralegal proceedings (172).9  This legal language involves the knife in the 
question of Tom’s guilt and his agency.  The knife becomes both object and text, like the 
will, when treated as evidence to a crime.  When Tom realizes selling the stolen knife 
will implicate him in the crime of its theft, his manner of viewing the object transforms it 
from material to textual: “[He] brooded in his room a long time, disconsolate and forlorn, 
with Luigi’s Indian knife for a text” (PW 155).  The object crosses beyond the realm of 
the material and becomes a text when Tom contemplates how to recover its abstract 
monetary value despite the specific history that makes it unsalable on the market.  While 
Luigi and Angelo value the knife for its role in saving their lives, Tom understands it in 
terms of its monetary value.  Tom’s fixation on the object’s monetary value is rejected 
and refuted by the other characters in the novel so that the knife can continue to serve its 
function as a legal agent.10 
The knife’s legal life culminates when Twain’s characters imagine it as speaking 
to or witnessing the events of Judge Driscoll’s murder.  After stabbing his uncle to death 
                                                
9 When Tom realizes he cannot sell the knife because of Wilson’s scheme to reveal the thief, he proposes to 
Roxy his own counter-scheme, figured as a “suppositious case,” upon which she delivers her own “verdict” 
(PW 167).  In similar language, Tom supposes the “case” to Wilson and Constable Blake that the twins 
never lost the knife at all (PW 167).   
10 For example, Judge Driscoll refuses to accept that his beloved father’s watch may have been stolen 
“because lost things stand a better chance of being found than stolen ones,” an act of denial that privileges 
the watch’s sentimental value over its monetary value (PW 147). 
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with the knife, Tom “flung it from him, as being a dangerous witness to carry away with 
him” (PW 195).  Twain figures the knife as a potential “witness” that could testify to 
Tom’s crime.  Tom demonstrates his awareness that the knife’s involvement in the 
murder has given it a legal life.  If found on his person, the knife in combination with his 
possession of it would create a narrative connecting him to the crime.  When Luigi is 
indicted for the murder, Tom attributes the cause to the knife: “how lucky!  It is the knife 
that has done him this grace” (PW 197).  As a murder weapon, the knife holds the power 
to condemn its possessor.  Its materiality, however, also serves to facilitate the creation of 
a narrative condemning the guilty party. 
After Tom escapes the scene of the crime, he reflects, “All the detectives on earth 
couldn’t trace me now” (PW 196-7).  Tom fails to realize that he has, in fact, left a trace 
on the murder weapon—his fingerprints.  Twain’s reference to the materiality of the trace 
left at the crime scene likely draws on Edmond Locard’s Exchange Principle, the 
founding principle of forensic science.  Locard theorized that “Every contact leaves a 
trace,” meaning that an exchange of physical evidence takes place every time a criminal 
comes into contact with an object at a crime scene and that a forensic investigation can 
reproduce the events of the crime by finding and following this trace.11  Twain appeals to 
the language of the trace to suggest that Tom’s physical interaction with the material 
world will in fact be his downfall.  Because Tom does not understand his relationship to 
the material objects he encounters—that his touch leaves a mark—Tom fails to imagine 
                                                
11 For more on Locard and the history of the development of forensic science, see Joe Nickell and John F. 
Fischer, Crime Science: Methods of Forensic Detection (1999) and Paul L. Kirk, Crime Investigation: 
Physical Evidence and the Police Laboratory (1974). 
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the possibility that his actions could have imprinted themselves onto the material world.  
Twain again foregrounds the material trace when Tom rejoices that he cannot be 
discovered without the trace that generates a forensic evidence trail: “Nearly always in 
cases like this there is some little detail or other overlooked, some wee little track or trace 
left behind, and detection follows; but here there’s not even the faintest suggestion of a 
trace left” (PW 206).  A figure of forensic power, Wilson does find the “perfect tracings 
of the finger-marks on the knife-handle” (PW 199).  The fingerprints that ultimately 
allow Wilson to solve the crime and reestablish Tom’s and Chambers’ original identities 
represent a unique kind of evidence, both physical and textual.  Because the fingerprint 
merges textual inscription (“print”) with the physical body (“finger”), placing evidence of 
this nature at the center of his novel allows Twain to critique the way legal authorities 
variously present evidence as either textual or material to serve their interests.  Whether 
the document, the weapon, or the forensic evidence figures in the courtroom as a text to 
be read and interpreted or an object to be observed and listened to depends on where the 
legal authority desires to locate criminal agency. 
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FINGERPRINTING: WHERE TEXT MEETS BODY 
As fingerprinting emerged as a new forensic technology in the late nineteenth 
century, legal authorities had to demonstrate its relationship to legal proof and the 
production of truth before it could be accepted as legally valid evidence.  As discussed 
above, early fingerprint cases involved arguments for the relevance and efficacy of this 
new kind of evidence as attorneys fought to expand or revise the evidence rules and 
procedures that regulate what counts as evidence in the courtroom.  As Cole has 
discovered, legal experts performed dramatic courtroom demonstrations of their ability to 
interpret fingerprints that mimicked Twain’s fiction (239-40).  Some court opinions, such 
as State v. Kuhl (1918) and Stacy v. State (1930), even cited Twain as a legal authority on 
fingerprint technology (Cole 240).  In Twain’s climactic courtroom scene, Wilson’s 
preparation of the fingerprint evidence for court demonstrates that a convincing 
performance was necessary to win the acceptance of fingerprinting as a means of 
producing legal proof.  Despite the law’s maxim that the evidence speaks for itself, the 
evidence cannot stand on its own.  Interpreting the new kind of evidence presented by the 
fingerprint requires expertise, for to the “untrained eye” all prints look the same (PW 
211).  Nor can the evidence be understood until it has been ordered into a schematic and 
“arranged” “according to a plan in which a progressive order and sequence was a 
principal feature” (PW 211).  Making the physical evidence signify in court requires the 
creation of a narrative.  Despite its physicality, Twain figures the fingerprint as a text 
more than an object. 
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Twain’s attention to the inscriptive nature of forensics, or the way in which the 
textual evidence of a print is understood as physical proof found on the body, forecloses 
the possibility of distinguishing between text and human.  Just as Brown sees the objects 
in Twain’s work as imbued with the power to define their human subjects, in Pudd’nhead 
Wilson fingerprints hold the ultimate power to define Tom as a slave.12  Placed into 
conversation with evidence law, the mutually constituting relationship between humans 
and objects that Brown proposes appears to underpin the law’s ability to produce truth.  
When a legal authority narrates an object into a witness, human agency animates the 
object into its speaking capacity yet relies on the object to hide that agency.  At the trial, 
Wilson rejects the testimony of human beings as unnecessary, creating instead the 
illusion that his physical evidence speaks for itself.  When his witnesses are delayed, he 
says he “should probably not have occasion to make use of their testimony” (PW 212).  
Instead, the fingerprints offer a superior kind of testimony: “I have other testimony—and 
better” (PW 212).  Just as the knife becomes a witness, so too do the fingerprints take on 
the ability to speak to the events of the crime.  Fingerprint evidence creates the illusion 
that a textual inscription can directly represent the truth of the body and mitigate the need 
for interpretation.  In Wilson’s courtroom performance, Twain reinscribes fingerprint 
technology with the problems of narrative construction and subjective interpretation. 
As signs taken from the body, fingerprints in Pudd’nhead Wilson serve not only 
to solve the murder but to “police legal racial identities” (Cole 237).  As Chinn suggests, 
                                                
12 In “The Tyranny of Things (Trivia in Karl Marx and Mark Twain),” Brown’s discussion of 
“impression” metaphors in The Prince and the Pauper suggests certain objects create and legitimize 
political authority (463-4). 
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the assumption that the body’s visible signs speak for themselves facilitates racial 
categorization (6).  Imagined as texts that could be read only by experts, bodies could be 
used to testify against themselves in service to projects of subordination and 
marginalization (7).  Mired in the assumption that the body reveals or makes legible the 
nature of the interior, fingerprint technology turns the body into a text.  As a text that can 
only be read by certain experts, who also obscure their act of interpretation behind the 
objectivity of the scientific method, fingerprints demonstrate that the policing of racial 
boundaries is a function of both the authority of legal procedure and the acceptance of 
public opinion. 
Twain emphasizes Wilson’s need to shape the evidence into a form of proof 
acceptable to his audience.  Wilson declares that he will prove a series of points “by 
evidence,” but the narrator reveals that Wilson plans to “try a few handy guesses” to “fill 
up gaps” in his “theory of origin and motive” (PW 213).  To convince the audience, 
Wilson must create a narrative, but like any narrative, it depends on the imagination of its 
author.  As Ronald Thomas suggests, the literary figure of the detective performs 
“narrative usurpation” by converting the stories told by witnesses or suspects into 
evidence used to condemn or exonerate, an act Thomas characterizes as a “disciplining 
agency” (656).  Seen this way, the regulation of identity becomes a matter of the rights to 
a person’s story (660).  While the detective controls subjects by speaking for them, he 
must simultaneously elide his own speaking power behind the guise of scientific 
objectivity.  The usurped narrative, despite being produced by a legal expert, acquires its 
epistemological legitimacy from the perceived objectivity of forensic science.  The 
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narrative climax designed by Twain, as Gillman explains, generates suspense not from 
the hidden identity of the murderer but from the question of whether Wilson discover him 
(90).  As Twain draws our attention to Wilson’s scientific and discursive methods, “how 
we know has replaced what we know as the object of inquiry” (Gillman 93).13  The 
fingerprint’s combination of material and textual interpretation brings the reader’s 
attention back to the epistemological function of the evidence procedures that guide the 
courtroom’s production of knowledge. 
Procedure is precisely what turns a potentially objective method of identification 
into a means of racial criminalization.  As Cole argues, Twain deconstructs the way 
fingerprinting was combined with racial politics to construct legal and biological fictions 
(238).  Most critics argue that despite the technology’s individualizing potential, legal 
practices incorporated this new type of evidence into a system oriented toward policing 
racial boundaries.14  Hsu concludes that Twain deploys the fingerprint to “critique the 
structural inequalities that ground racial comparison” within the broader context of laws 
that limit “who can testify in court, who can be employed by the state, who can vote or 
run for office, who can apply for citizenship, and who can move or stay still in public 
                                                
13 Gillman explains that Wilson’s defense speech is mainly an explanation of his method: “along with the 
murderer, what is on trial in the courtroom conclusion is Wilson’s method of deducing identity, his 
‘scientifics,’ the fingerprinting system” (88-9). 
14 Cole, Thomas, Chinn, Gillman, and Samuels all discuss this contradiction.  Gillman notes Twain’s 
seemingly contradictory attitude of fascination and suspicion towards fingerprinting, but ultimately settles 
on the fingerprint as a tool for social control: “Fingerprints appear theoretically to be the one measure of 
unique, non-contingent, individual identity, but are in practice relational indices that must be read in and 
against the context of other sets of prints” (91).  In Twain’s deployment of the fingerprint trope, however, 
what the fingerprints prove is not the stability of racial identity but the mutability of a racial system in 
which a white person’s identity can be exchanged with a black person’s, in which an identity can cross 
back and forth across the slave/free and black/white boundaries (91).  Carton also briefly explains that 
fingerprints “collapse the distinction between biology and convention, for they represent biology in the 
service of convention” (92).  
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space” (81).  The novel’s engagement with the social anxieties and cultural climate in 
which the legal logic of segregation was able to gain credence, as Sundquist argues, 
exposes the cultural-turned-legal trends that defined race in pseudo-scientific biological 
terms in order to justify legalized discrimination as “natural” (47).  Attention to legal 
procedure allows us to examine how the structure of structural inequality is produced.  
Rather than read statutes and judicial rulings as a preexisting context from which racial 
fictions emerge, we must consider how legal procedure regulates how these laws and 
rulings are produced. 
Twain’s novel is not just a commentary on the racist legal atmosphere of his era 
but shows an acute awareness of the way legal procedure operates as the strings behind 
the curtain.  When the trial seems hopeless, Wilson uses legal procedure to gain time.  He 
argues that one witness’s mention of a veiled woman leaving the crime scene, “taken 
with certain circumstantial evidence which he would call the court’s attention to,” should 
convince the court “that a stay of proceedings ought to be granted, in justice to his clients, 
until that person should be discovered” (PW 205).  Wilson capitalizes on the missing 
evidence concerning this unidentified person to argue for a stay of proceedings that might 
give him time to produce the real perpetrator.  That the trial hinges on the skillful 
manipulation of legal procedure recalls the performative production of truth established 
by Roxy’s manipulation of identity. 
Despite the “Whisper to the Reader” in which Twain farcically guarantees that his 
law chapters adhere to the reality of the law, and despite his sustained attention to the 
nuances of legal procedure in “Those Extraordinary Twins,” Twain allows the courtroom 
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in Pudd’nhead Wilson to diverge significantly from the evidence laws regulating hearsay.  
“Several witnesses swore they heard Judge Driscoll say in his public speech that the 
twins would be able to find their lost knife again when they needed it to assassinate 
somebody” (PW 204).  Evidence rules exclude hearsay statements because the person 
reportedly speaking is not under oath and therefore not bound by the standard of veracity 
ensured by the oath (Gallanis 508).  In Twain’s trial, however, this hearsay evidence is 
allowed to stand and even given “prophetic” weight (PW 204).  Exceptions to the hearsay 
law abound—there are at least forty exceptions in the most recent edition of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence that guide modern law in America today—and one such exception, the 
dying declaration, almost applies to this situation.  As Chinn explains, in the dying 
declaration the law imagines that words and body merge; as the body loses its materiality, 
language is allowed to substitute for the absent body (15).  Although Judge Driscoll’s 
statement was not a dying declaration, his death gives his words special weight.  His legal 
afterlife allows his words to defy exclusionary evidence rules because the law privileges 
the no-longer human.  The dying declaration exception rests on the idea that some bodies 
cannot speak for themselves.  In this way, evidence law likens other silenced bodies to 
the dead.  As Chinn argues, “The absent body in the exceptions to the hearsay rule is 
uncomfortably close to the abstracted excluded body of the black soldier, or the atomized 
bodies of genetics: crucial to the scene of evidence but silenced from it” (15). 
While some bodies are silenced by legal procedure, others like the jury are given 
an extraordinary degree of speaking power.  The jury, however, is imagined as serving in 
the capacity of performing reason; they do not speak so much as view, comprehend, and 
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weigh various types of evidence (Chinn 12).  Throughout Twain’s courtroom scene, the 
jury’s role as standard of proof merges with that of the general audience.  Twain draws 
attention to the public’s reactions in parentheticals that gauge the dramatic impact of the 
evidence being presented.  As Wilson unwinds his argument, its validity is confirmed by 
“a nodding of heads among the audience by way of admission that this was not a bad 
stroke” (PW 214).  When Wilson proves his ability to distinguish one set of fingerprints 
from another, he proves this to both the jury and the audience.  Winning the trial depends 
on his successful performance of his new forensic technology, a performance that 
produces legal truth by convincing the members of his audience.  In establishing the 
audience’s credulity as the standard of proof, Twain makes visible the question of who 
controls the production of knowledge in the courtroom—the evidence, legal procedure, or 
human performers. 
Legal historians have suggested that evidence law developed to protect judges and 
jurors from the moral burden of passing judgment (Whitman 12-13).  The judicial 
procedure stipulating that “the judge judges according to the evidence presented, not 
according to his ‘conscience’” allows the evidence to appear as the arbiter of justice 
instead of the judge (Shapiro 154).  The rise of the jury system, however, placed 
arbitration in the hands of jurors who were instructed to return a verdict both according to 
their consciences and the evidence (Shapiro 162).  Bushell’s Case of 1670 established 
that jurors be allowed to decide their verdict independent of the judge, the letter of the 
law, and the rules of evidence, a ruling that recognized that the evidence deposed in court 
could be false and located jurors as the superior source of truth (Shapiro 156).  As 
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Shapiro explains, the Bushell’s Case ruling “might be best explained as a legal fiction 
utilised for political purposes to prevent judges from usurping the fact-finding role of 
jurors” (156).  The jurors’ oath demands they return a true verdict, not that they uphold 
the law or adhere to the rules of evidence (Shapiro 167).  The great leeway given to the 
jury seems to stand in contradiction to the power of evidence law to regulate how truth is 
produced in the courtroom.  Twain’s courtroom scene, in which audience participation 
forms the center of the drama, reveals the way evidence law, legal procedure, and human 
authorities work together to police racial and criminal identities.  While the rules of 
evidence regulate which objects are allowed to speak before the court, the jury’s freedom 
to return whatever verdict it determines best returns ultimate power to the human 
authorities. 
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MUTE SUBJECTS 
A literature and the law approach focused on the animation of objects reveals the 
human desires behind the legal fiction that “evidence speaks for itself.”  When legal 
authorities imbue objects with agency and speech, they deny the right of speech to 
marginalized subjects.  The creditors who come to collect the now-fungible slave Tom 
redefine guilt and agency as they turn Tom into an object of possession.  They argue, “if 
he had been delivered up to them in the first place, they would have sold him and he 
could not have murdered Judge Driscoll, therefore it was not he that had really committed 
the murder, the guilt lay with the erroneous inventory” (PW 225-6).  The creditors assign 
guilt to the “erroneous inventory” instead of any acting capacity on behalf of Tom.  The 
animation of the inventory contributes to Tom’s objectification and the denial of his 
agency.  Here the word “inventory” can function as either noun or verb, referring both to 
a list of things and the act of accounting for them.  In this grammatical construction, guilt 
comes from the misrecognition of an object’s value and the failure to catalogue it 
properly.  At the same time, the inventory’s guilt implicates the entire society that has 
created and managed the slave system that gives such inventories the power to define 
human life as a salable commodity (Gillman 92).  The community’s assignment of guilt 
to the erroneous inventory also reminds us that slave inventories did commit a kind of 
murder, in terms of Orlando Patterson’s social death, through the “complex of communal 
values which, expressed in legalistic process, can reduce a human being to a datum of 
stocktaking” (Briden 178).  Removing the blame from Tom serves not to exonerate him, 
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but to recover his economic value.  As Cole notes, Tom is saved from execution by “his 
body’s economic value to the estate of the man he murdered” in a line of reasoning that 
privileges his slave identity over his criminal identity (237).15  Yet these two identities 
are mutually constitutive.  It is only after Tom is established as a criminal that his racial 
identity can be revealed and accepted as truth by the community.  Tom’s reclassification 
as a slave and an item of property is fostered by his classification as a criminal.  Only 
through the objectification of criminality can the people of Dawson’s Landing reimagine 
their wealthy white aristocrat as a black slave. 
Tom’s criminal identity arises from the power of evidence to pass judgment.  
Wilson’s language during the final revelation of criminality gives the fingerprints the 
agency to sentence Tom to death.  Wilson instructs Tom to “make upon the window the 
finger-prints that will hang you!” (PW 222).  In this rhetorical gesture, the evidence hangs 
Tom, not the judge or jury, or the racist society.  As Chinn observes, at this moment Tom 
loses the power of speech and is “reduced from audience member to object of 
surveillance to spectacle to lifeless body . . . to object of exchange” (48).  Tom looks 
“imploringly toward the speaker” and makes an “impotent movement” before he “slid 
limp and lifeless to the floor,” and never speaks again (PW 222-3). Tom’s reduction to a 
“lifeless” state brings home the dehumanizing effect of both slave law and criminal 
procedure.  Just as Brown’s theory of mutually constituting subjects and objects suggests, 
                                                
15 Within this logic, Gillman argues, terms like “punish” and “pardon” lose their meaning if to pardon a 
man means to sell him into slavery and to punish a murder means to create a slave (92). 
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here the fingerprint constitutes the subject as criminal and racial.  That constitution in 
turn removes Tom from the realm of the subject and renders him mute and lifeless. 
The history of U.S. law abounds with legalized methods to deny racialized bodies 
the power to speak in court.  Hsu has traced how Twain’s work as a journalist in 
California brought him into contact with the discriminatory laws that restricted the 
testimony of racial others.  In 1850 the California state legislature stipulated that no 
black, mulatto, or Indian person could give evidence against any white person, and in 
1854 the law was extended to exclude Chinese witnesses as well (Hsu 70).  The ban on 
nonwhite testimony, an example of exclusionary evidence law deployed to deny certain 
subjects’ speech, exemplifies how the legal procedures that regulate evidence determine 
what types of knowledge have legal authority.  The procedural laws governing what types 
of evidence are “admissible” in court have been designed to exclude particular voices.  
Using fingerprinting as the novel’s primary technique for producing truth, Twain moves 
from a critique of forensics to a broader critique of the operating principles of the law.  
Not only does Pudd’nhead Wilson help us understand the performative nature of 
evidence, the novel reveals the fictions upon which law depends.  While race may be “a 
fiction of law and custom,” Twain’s novel also proves that law is a fiction of evidence 
and procedure. 
 As we have seen, the human procedure that condemns the criminalized or 
racialized subject hides its agency in the language of the animated object.  Following 
Stephen Best and Edlie Wong, my approach to literature and the law has emphasized the 
procedural forms in which legal logic is coded to suggest that law is made of a set of 
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operative fictions.  Both Best and Wong have recognized these fictions by pointing to 
law’s reliance on counterfactuals and analogies.  Best argues that analogy functions as the 
major type of causality in a judge’s ruling.  As he reminds us, “in nineteenth-century 
property disputes, courts often contend with novel forms of property through recourse to 
analogy (e.g., What good historically protected by law does the emergent and disputed 
one resemble?  What is it ‘like’?)” (24).  The outcome of a case depends on an analogous 
appeal to precedent and a speculative appeal to future implications.  Like Best, Wong 
implicitly recognizes the ways in which legal reasoning relies on analogy when she finds, 
“Solicitors defending slaveholders’ property rights often analogized enslavement in 
Britain to those contractual obligations subsisting between master and servant in their 
attempts to manage the master-slave relation under the conflicting laws of slavery and 
freedom” (11).   As Wong, Best, and other literature and the law scholars have shown, the 
work of legal authorities is largely imaginative, and in this way literature and the law 
operate based on similar principles.  However, the recognition that law operates based on 
the principles of fiction does not make the consequences of the law any less binding.  
Twain makes this argument in Pudd’nhead Wilson.  While he might satirize race as “a 
fiction of law and custom,” his farce concludes with the tragedy that this fiction rules the 
lives, deaths, freedom, and enslavement of his characters and those of the society he 
critiques.  
Originating in fiction does not reduce race’s power to determine social lives.  
Race, as Carton reminds us, is “a fiction that nonetheless counts as stark fact” (85).  As 
Matthew Frye Jacobson says of the “fabrication” of racial categories in the United States, 
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just because they are “public fictions” does not mean they do not hold real power.  They 
are created, and as Jacobson says, “It’s just a question of who does the making” (3).  
Pudd’nhead Wilson demonstrates the process of “making” race and answers the question 
of who does the making.  In Jacobson’s formulation, race operates according to a 
“seemingly natural but finally unstable logic” (2).  Race requires an appeal to several 
authorities: science, the state, and culture.  In combination, these authorities create and 
enforce “these public fictions called races” (3).  The idea of “public fictions” can be 
expanded to include law and literature, both of which carry real consequences by virtue 
of their involvement in public negotiations.  While a number of critics have argued that 
Twain exposes the fictions undergirding law, few have considered the implication of 
objects in the process of producing racialized truth.  Gillman, Cole, and Ronald Thomas 
have noted Twain’s skepticism concerning the ability of law or science to produce 
unambiguous truth, but they do not consider how Twain points us to legal procedure as a 
site of production for these truths.  Twain demonstrates how the law regulates racial 
categories and suggests that the power of these categories is not undermined by their 
arbitrariness.  Twain’s “fiction” of race refers to its arbitrary structure and its artificial 
origin in human invention, but he recognizes that it is no less powerful for that. 
We can read the legal language of evidence law as enacting its own form of 
racialization.  As Barbara Shapiro reveals, the language of “satisfied conscience” used to 
instruct juries in their determination of the truth usually accompanies an emphasis on 
evaluating the evidence; these instructions almost always pair truth and conscience (163).  
As Sundquist and Brook Thomas have uncovered in their comparisons of Twain’s novel 
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to the Plessy v. Ferguson decision, the Supreme Court opinion that established the 
“separate but equal” doctrine did so by granting discretion in social issues to the states.  
As Thomas explains, “in determining the question of reasonableness [the state] is at 
liberty to act with reference to the established usages, custom, and traditions of the 
people” (American 193).  Leaving the issue of social regulation up to the customs of the 
people, the Plessy decision’s logic appeals to the abstract ideal of contractual equality and 
fails to recognize the concrete social and historical conditions of lived experience (194).  
The variability of discretion and conscience is built into the law’s structural procedure.  
Despite handing the ultimate power to produce truth to the inevitably prejudiced and 
partial “people,” the law justifies itself with the language of objective evidence.  
Common courtroom language describing the evidence as irresistible or convincing treats 
the evidence as having a voice of its own.  When the evidence “speaks for itself,” we 
must remember that this speech act has been carefully orchestrated by human authorities 
who have constructed which evidence can be present in court, what it can be understood 
to mean, and for whom it speaks. 
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